KEY DEVELOPMENTS – COMMERCIAL INCIDENTS
During the monitoring period 17 – 23 June Regal Maritime Solutions (RMS) identified the
following incidents in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden region:
COMMERCIAL VESSEL SUNK: On 18 June, military authorities reported maritime debris and oil sighted in the last reported location of the MV TUTOR which was evacuated on 14 June after being struck by a Houthi USV and missile. The vessel is
believed to have sunk in position 14° 19’N 041° 49’E.
MISSILE ATTACK: On 21 June an incident was reported 126NM east of Aden after explosions were reported in the vicinity of the vessel. The crew were reported safe and the vessel continued to its next port of call.
SOLAS INCIDENT: On 23 June, a vessel responded to a SOLAS (Safety of Life at Sea) incident after it received a distress call after from a merchant vessel approximately 96NM southeast of Nishtun, Yemen. The merchant vessel reported flooding aboard that
could not be contained, and that the crew had to abandon ship. The ship remains a drift in the vicinity of location 14° 31’N 053° 08’E.
UAV ATTACK: On 23 June, the commercial vessel MV TRANSWORLD NAVIGATOR was hit by a unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) resulting in damage to the vessel approximately 65NM west of Al Hudaydah. The crew were reported safe and continued to its next port of call.
IRANIAN INTELLIGENCE VESSEL: The last reported position of the Iranian intelligence vessel, the Behshad, was on 2 June in the vicinity of Bostanu port in the Persian Gulf in Iranian territorial waters.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS – MILITARY ACTIVITY
During the monitoring period 17 – 23 June RMS identified the following incidents involving US coalition forces in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden region, obtained from military and open sources:
USV/UAV INTERCEPT: On 17 June, US forces successfully destroyed four Houthi radars and one uncrewed surface vessel (USV) in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen. US forces also destroyed one unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) over the Red Sea. No injuries or damage were reported by US, coalition, or commercial vessels.
UAV INTERCEPT: On 18 June, US forces destroyed eight Houthi unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) systems in a Houthi controlled area of Yemen.
UAV INTERCEPT: On 18 June, coalition forces destroyed one Houthi launched UAV over the Gulf of Aden. No injuries or damage were reported by US, coalition, or commercial vessels.
USV INTERCEPT: On 19 June, US forces destroyed two Houthi uncrewed surface vessels (USV) in the Red Sea. Additionally, US forces destroyed one ground control station and one command and control node in a Houthi controlled area of Yemen.
USV/UAV INTERCEPT: On 20 June, US forces destroyed four Houthi uncrewed surface vessels (USV) in the Red Sea, and two UAVs over the Red Sea. No injuries or damage were reported by vessels in the region.
MISSILE ATTACK: On 22 June, Houthi militants launched three anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM) from a Houthi controlled area of Yemen into the Gulf of Aden. No injuries or significant damage reported by US, coalition, or commercial vessels.
UAV ATTACK: On 23 June, Houthi militants struck the MV TRANSWORLD NAVIGATOR, a Liberian-flagged, Greek-owned, and operated bulk cargo carrier in a suspected unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) attack in the Red Sea. The crew reported minor injuries and moderate damage to the ship, but the vessel has continued on its voyage. The MV TRANSWORLD NAVIGATOR recently docked in Malaysia and was en route to Egypt. This marksis the fourth attack by Houthi militants on the M/V TRANSWORLD NAVIGATOR.
The US central command has denied unverified reports by Houthi militants that it had successfully struck the US aircraft carrier the USS Dwight D Eisenhower.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS – HOUTHI MISSILE STATISTICS
Figures 1 and 2 identifies the number of missiles, UAV, USVs and UUVs launched, or prepared to be imminently launched, by Houthi militants from Yemen targeting commercial and naval vessels in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden regions. Figures have incorporated statistics from vessels hit, near misses and pre- emptive strikes on-land in Yemen by US-led Coalition forces but not those resulting from large scale coordinated military action. In some cases the destined target of Houthi weapons including destroyed on-land in Yemen cannot not be verified and has therefore been categorised as ‘Not Known’ (NK). Where no dates are provided there were no reported incidents or data available for that period.
ANALYSIS: The monitoring period saw continued sustained Houthi attacks on commercial vessels similar to those over the past three weeks, demonstrating a more consistent approach to their strategy. Once again the majority of Houthi attacks have been focused on the Red Sea region but shifted with increased focus to vessels in the Gulf of Aden towards the end of the week.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS – SECURITY INCIDENT MAPPING
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
During the monitoring period 17 – 23 June RMS identified the following key regional developments:
• On 17 June, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) issued a statement suggesting they had disbanded approximately half of Hamas’ fighting forces in the southeast sector of the Gazan city of Rafah, killing around 550 Hamas fighters.
• On 18 June, Hezbollah published drone footage of several locations in Northern Israel, demonstrating that Hezbollah projectiles were able to bypass Israeli military defences. The Lebanese based group said the area captured in footage stretches over 2.5 square miles (6.5 square km) of Israeli territory, situated 15 miles (approx. 24 km) off Lebanon’s border with the Palestinian territories. Hezbollah indicated that footage captured included Haifa port and military base and the Rafael military complex.
• On 18 June, the IDF announced they had developed and approved plans for an invasion of southern Lebanon, following an intensification of cross-border fighting with Hezbollah over recent weeks. IDF commanders also made decisions regarding “accelerating the readiness of the forces on the ground”. The announcement came after Hezbollah released a nine-minute video of what it claimed to be aerial footage captured by surveillance drones, showing parts of Israel.
• On 18 June, Qatari Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al-Thani met with Hamas Politburo chief Ismail Haniyeh, in which the prime minister emphasised the importance Haniyeh consider accepting the terms of the ceasefire agreement proposed by the US.
• On 19 June, Hezbollah general secretary, Hassan Nasrallah, threatened to target Cyprus if the country allowed Israel to use its territory to launch attacks on Lebanon. Cypriot President Nikos Christodoulides responded in a social media post that his country was “not involved in the conflict in any way.” and that Cyprus maintained communication with the governments of Lebanon and Iran, and stressed the importance of diplomacy.
• On 19 June, the Yemen based Houthi group released footage of their attacks on the MV TUTOR in the Red Sea, which killed one crew member. The footage emerged a day after vessel was confirmed to have sunk. In the footage, two USVs are observed impacting the TUTOR. One of the strikes shown is believed to be from the initial 12 June attack, along with several other explosions. Details when the second USV attack and the other explosions occurred is unclear and may have taken place after the crew abandoned the vessel on 14 June. Houthi militants filmed the attack from a nearby vessel, within line of sight of USV strikes on the TUTOR.
• The cargo vessel VERBENA is reportedly undergoing salvage operations, according to the maritime publication TradeWinds issued on 20 June. The VERBENA was struck by missiles in the Gulf of Aden on 13 June and subsequently abandoned by its crew.
• The use of USVs with dummy figures as crew to target the MV TUTOR a week ago demonstrates Houthi level of creativity and methodology to try and close the distance between the USV and its intended target without rousing suspicion and thus evasive action until it’s too late. This also enables the USV to carry a greater explosive payload and have a greater explosive effect on the vessel.
ASSESSMENT
• Further complex attacks by Houthi militants on commercial vessels in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden region using a combination of weaponry are likely over the coming
weeks, and may involve further USVs along side aerial attacks. The use of USVs would place Houthi forces at greater risk from naval forces in the region.
• Houthi long-range attacks in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean against commercial shipping will continue to be an objective of Houthi militants but will face challenges compared to their operations in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.
• Vessels linked to Israel, the US and UK will remain primary, but not sole targets for Houthi militants. Houthi use of inaccurate data and intelligence pertaining to target identification, and/or maintaining an effective command and control procedure with local units, places non Israeli, US and UK vessels at a risk of being misidentified, including Russian and Chinese linked vessels.
• The US and its partners will continue to conduct pre-emptive strikes against Houthi targets on-land in an attempt to degrade Houthi military capability and prevent Houthi weaponry to be used to target commercial shipping.
• The US will continue its efforts to intercept vessels smuggling weapon components from Iran to the Houthis in Yemen and enhance its intelligence collection methods to support interdiction operations, as well as coordinate military strikes against Houthi weapon sites, facilities and capabilities.
• The US government will continue to push for a diplomatic solution for the Israel-Hamas conflict with regional partners due to the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Gaza and
attempt to prevent escalatory military activity in the region, particularly in Lebanon.
• Any ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, may see a temporary pause in attacks, but continues to appear unlikely at present.
• High likelihood of intensified attacks by Israel on Hezbollah positions in southern Lebanon over the coming weeks due to increased Hezbollah activity along the Lebanon-Israel border.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Merchant and other vulnerable vessels are recommended to register with the Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa’s Voluntary Registration Scheme due to heightened piracy threat in the Indian ocean.
• Avoid being in vicinity of Iranian Behshad vessel. Avoid where possible transiting locations within the UAE and Iranian coastlines due to the risk from Iranian military boarding parties.
• Vessels operating in the Indian Ocean area are urged to heighten their vigilance due expanded risk area from Houthi missile and UAV attack and continued threat from Pirate Activity Groups (PAGs) in the area.
• Report any Suspicious Sightings and be aware of the risk of Uncrewed Surface Vehicles (USVs) with dummy crews and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) attacks.
• Consider utilising a digital monitoring system, which incorporates UAV/UUV drone monitoring to warn of potential attack and use of physical barriers, such as nets and underwater barriers, that can be deployed to prevent UUVs from approaching a ship. These barriers can entangle or obstruct the movement of a UUV.
• Ensure crew conduct drills and training exercises to respond to UUV threats so that they are well-prepared to take appropriate action in the event of an incident.
• Follow guidance on loitering munitions as per the OCIMF website: https://www.ocimf.org/publications/information-papers/loitering-munitions-%E2%80%93-the-threat-to-merchant-ships
• Implement and review BMP5 in particular section 2, which describes non-piracy threats and the Global Anti-Piracy Guide.
• Consider mentioning vessel location to Flag Authorities.
• Inform UKMTO/MSCHoA of vessel movements and ensure radar is kept on.
• Communicate with local agents for any local information or intelligence.
• Keep VHF Ch16 on and pay attention to advisories. Ensure strict surveillance of communications and establish communication with all approaching vessels.
• Do not allow small boats to approach or dock. Consider utilizing an armed security team aboard.
• Ensure there is Hard Cover available if on deck and that it is accessible.
• Ensure a Secondary Muster Station is considered and identified to crew and not just the citadel.
• Maintain Bridge Watches. (Please be aware at night, small, slow vessels without a wake are difficult to detect on radar). Keep Traffic on Upper Deck to a minimum
• Ensure all fire-fighting equipment is checked and available for immediate use. Including the emergency fire pump and that relevant maintenance has been conducted.
