KEY DEVELOPMENTS – COMMERCIAL INCIDENTS
During the monitoring period 24 – 30 June Regal Maritime Solutions (RMS) identified the following incidents in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden region:
MISSILE ATTACK: On 24 June, an explosion was reported close to a commercial vessel MSC SARAH V, approximately 264NM southeast of Nishtun, Yemen, whilst in the Arabian Sea. The crew was reported safe and the vessel continued to its next port of call. According to Houthi spokesperson Saree, this it was the first time a hypersonic missile was used to target a commercial vessel.
MISSILE ATTACK: On 25 June an attack was reported in the vicinity of commercial vessel LILA LISBON in the Gulf of Aden, approximately 52NM south of Aden.
USV STRIKE: On 27 June the Greek-owned, Malta-flagged Panamax bulker SEAJOY was struck by a waterborne improvised explosive device (WBIED) approximately 83NM southwest of Al-Hudaydah. The vessel reported minor damage and the crew were reported safe. The vessel continued to its next port of call. A US-led coalition warship in the area responded to the incident.
MISSILE ATTACK: On 28 June, Houthi militants launched five missiles towards the tanker DELONIX, whilst transiting the Red Sea 150 nautical miles northwest of Al-Hudaydah, which landed near the vessel.
SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY: On 30 June, a commercial vessel the SUMMER LADY reported being approached by 12 small craft consisting of fast boats and smaller kayak-type boats of which some were observed to be uncrewed approximately 13 NM southwest of Al Mukha in the vicinity of the Bab-el-Mandeb. The closest point of approach was around 1.5NM from the vessel. The small boats remained in the vicinity of the vessel for approximately an hour before departing the area. The vessel and crew were reported safe and proceeded with it voyage. The approach follows on from a USV attack on the MV Tutor on 18 June.
IRANIAN INTELLIGENCE VESSEL: The last reported position of the Iranian intelligence vessel, the Behshad, was on 2 June in the vicinity of Bostanu port in the Persian Gulf in Iranian territorial waters.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS – MILITARY ACTIVITY
During the monitoring period 24 – 30 June RMS identified the following incidents involving US coalition forces in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden region, obtained from military and open sources:
HOUTHI RADAR INTERCEPT: On 26 June, US forces destroyed a Houthi radar site in a Houthi controlled area of Yemen, considered as presenting a threat to vessels in the region.
UAV INTERCEPT: On 27 June, US forces destroyed one unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) launched by Houthi militants into the Red Sea.
UAV INTERCEPT: On 28 June, US forces destroyed seven Houthi UAVs and one ground control station vehicle located in a Houthi-controlled area of Yemen and determined an imminent threat to vessels in the region.
USV INTERCEPT: On 30 June, US forces conducted a pre-emptive engagement, destroying three Houthi uncrewed surface vessels (USVs) in the Red Sea.
Houthi forces confirmed they had targeted the TRANSWORLD NAVIGATOR vessel on 23 June, with a domestically developed “Toophan al-Mudammer” unmanned surface vehicle (USV) for the first time. The USV which is both manual and remote controlled are piloted by crew who can disembark from a safe distance before the USV homes in on its target. The unmanned drone boat can a warhead weighing between 1000 – 1500 kg. The USV can reportedly travel up to speeds of 45NM per hour and can operate in all sea conditions.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS – HOUTHI MISSILE STATISTICS
Figures 1 and 2 identifies the number of missiles, UAV, USVs and UUVs launched, or prepared to be imminently launched, by Houthi militants from Yemen targeting commercial and naval vessels in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden regions. Figures have incorporated statistics from vessels hit, near misses and pre- emptive strikes on-land in Yemen by US-led Coalition forces but not those resulting from large scale coordinated military action. In some cases the destined target of Houthi weapons including destroyed on-land in Yemen cannot not be verified and has therefore been categorised as ‘Not Known’ (NK). Where no dates are provided there were no reported incidents or data available for that period.
ANALYSIS: The monitoring period saw an increase in attacks compared to last week bringing it in line with the those prior. Attacks have been focused in both the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea region including an attack in the vicinity of the Gulf of Aden and Arabian Sea. This attack demonstrates Houthi attempts to target vessels further afield from their traditional area of operation.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS – SECURITY INCIDENT MAPPING
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
During the monitoring period 24 – 30 June RMS identified the following key regional developments:
•In addition to the Houthi attacks on the MSC SARAH V and SEAJOY, Houthi spokesperson Brigadier General Yahya Saree, stated the group had launched ballistic missiles at the DELONIX tanker, which the group claimed took a “direct hit.” However, the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) confirmed the vessel, which was targeted 150NM (278KM) northwest of the Yemeni port of Al Hudaydah, reported no damage and was heading northward.
•The group also claimed to have attacked the vessel IOANNIS in the Red Sea, the WALER oil tanker and the vessel JOHANNES MAERSK in the Mediterranean, due to their companies supporting Israel.
•The 24 June’s attack on the MSC SARAH V was the furthest confirmed attack launched against a commercial vessel in the Gulf of Aden by Houthi militants to date. The attack happened near the outer reaches of the Gulf of Aden where it becomes the Arabian Sea and ultimately the Indian Ocean. The action demonstrates the groups continued ambition target commercial shipping beyond the current target area.
•The Houthi military spokesman Brig. Gen. Yahya Saree claimed the attack on the MSV SARAH V used a new ballistic missile in the assault, suggesting a new hypersonic missile was used in the attack, which had recently undergone successful test operations. Information on whether the use of a hypersonic was used remains to be corroborated.
•On 26 June, the Houthi group in collaboration with the Iraqi resistance claimed to have jointly conducted a UAV attack utilising a number of drones on the vessel MSC Manzanillo whilst in the Israeli port of Haifa. The group reaffirmed their commitment to continue joint military operations in support of the Palestinian people until Israel’s aggression ceases and the siege on Gaza is lifted.
•The attacks come as the US aircraft carrier the USS Dwight D Eisenhower returned back to the US on 24 June. This follows an eight-month deployment in which it led the US response to the Houthi assaults, extending its deployment twice due to the ongoing tensions in the region.
•On 27 June Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu revived the government working group on the Iranian nuclear threat. The decision was taken amid intelligence received by the Israeli’s that Iran has begun conducting new research into its nuclear weapons programme. This comes as Inspectors with the UN nuclear watchdog the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed major new construction in the heavily protected Fordow enrichment plant. This follows Tehran’s recent announced of its intention to upgrade the fortified nuclear facility.
•On 29 June, a Hamas spokesperson confirmed that the group had not reached any progress on ceasefire negotiations with Israel.
•On 30 June, Israel and Hezbollah continue to exchange fire along the Lebanon-Israel border and the Golan Heights with Hezbollah injuring 17 Israeli troops following a UAV attack on an Israeli military installation, further fuelling the potential of escalation between both parties. Meanwhile the US warship, the US Wasp has been deployed to the eastern mediterranean in an attempt to diffuse tensions between Israel and Hezbollah, as well as provide support in the case evacuations are required in the event of increased hostilities.
•The Iranian Presidential election continues as the two main candidates, hardliner Saeed Jalili and reformist Masoud Pezeshkin face each other in a run-off due to take place on 5 July. NO matter the outcome, Iran is unlikely to change its posture in the Middle East including its support for proxies’ groups throughout the region and its strategy towards Israel. The Philippine Ministry for Migrant workers have banned Filipino mariners from serving aboard vessels linked to operators of the GALAXY LEADER, TRUE CONFIDENCE and TUTOR – vessels where Filipino crew have been detained or killed in Houthi attacks.
ASSESSMENT
•The use of a hypersonic missile by the Houthis, if corroborated, would increase the potential threat to commercial shipping beyond the currently geographical area to include the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean, and further demonstrate the groups continued ambitions to expand their area of operations to encompass these maritime areas. Despite this the attack on the MSC SARAH V does not indicate a permanent expansion to the Houthis area of operations beyond the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden at this stage.
•Vessels linked to Israel, the US and UK will remain primary, but not sole targets for Houthi militants. Houthi use of inaccurate data and intelligence pertaining to target identification, and/or maintaining an effective command and control procedure with local units, places non Israeli, US and UK vessels at a risk of being misidentified, including Russian and Chinese linked vessels. This was demonstrated further following the targeting of the tanker DELONIX which was bound from the Suez canal to China.
•The US and its partners will continue to conduct pre-emptive strikes against Houthi targets on-land in an attempt to degrade Houthi military capability and prevent Houthi weaponry to be used to target commercial shipping. This capability is likely to be impacted in the short-term as a consequence of the USS Dwight D Eisenhower’s departure from the region without a suitable substitute.
•The US will continue its efforts to intercept vessels smuggling weapon components from Iran to the Houthis in Yemen and enhance its intelligence collection methods to support interdiction operations, as well as coordinate military strikes against Houthi weapon sites, facilities and capabilities. The US government may begin to face increasing pressure domestically from political opponents to find an appropriate solution to the Houthi maritime threat in the region, as efforts thus far has not met its intended objective of dissuading or significantly disrupting Houthi aggression.
•The US government will continue to push for a diplomatic solution for the Israel-Hamas conflict with regional partners due to the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Gaza and attempt to prevent escalatory military activity in the region, particularly in Lebanon.
•Any ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, may see a temporary pause in attacks, but continues to appear unlikely at present.
•High likelihood of intensified attacks by Israel on Hezbollah positions in southern Lebanon over the coming weeks due to increased Hezbollah activity along the Lebanon-Israel border.
RECOMMENDATIONS
•Merchant and other vulnerable vessels are recommended to register with the Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa’s Voluntary Registration Scheme due to heightened piracy threat in the Indian ocean.
•Avoid being in vicinity of Iranian Behshad vessel. Avoid where possible transiting locations within the UAE and Iranian coastlines due to the risk from Iranian military boarding parties.
•Vessels operating in the Indian Ocean area are urged to heighten their vigilance due expanded risk area from Houthi missile and UAV attack and continued threat from Pirate Activity Groups (PAGs) in the area.
•Report any Suspicious Sightings and be aware of the risk of Uncrewed Surface Vehicles (USVs) with dummy crews and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) attacks.
•Consider utilising a digital monitoring system, which incorporates UAV/UUV drone monitoring to warn of potential attack and use of physical barriers, such as nets and underwater barriers, that can be deployed to prevent UUVs from approaching a ship. These barriers can entangle or obstruct the movement of a UUV.
•Ensure crew conduct drills and training exercises to respond to UUV threats so that they are well-prepared to take appropriate action in the event of an incident.
•Follow guidance on loitering munitions as per the OCIMF website: https://www.ocimf.org/publications/information-papers/loitering-munitions-%E2%80%93-the-threat-to-merchant-ships
•Implement and review BMP5 in particular section 2, which describes non-piracy threats and the Global Anti-Piracy Guide.
•Consider mentioning vessel location to Flag Authorities.
•Inform UKMTO/MSCHoA of vessel movements and ensure radar is kept on.
•Communicate with local agents for any local information or intelligence.
•Keep VHF Ch16 on and pay attention to advisories. Ensure strict surveillance of communications and establish communication with all approaching vessels.
•Do not allow small boats to approach or dock. Consider utilizing an armed security team aboard.
•Ensure there is Hard Cover available if on deck and that it is accessible.
•Ensure a Secondary Muster Station is considered and identified to crew and not just the citadel.
•Maintain Bridge Watches. (Please be aware at night, small, slow vessels without a wake are difficult to detect on radar). Keep Traffic on Upper Deck to a minimum
•Ensure all fire-fighting equipment is checked and available for immediate use. Including the emergency fire pump and that relevant maintenance has been conducted.
