KEY DEVELOPMENTS – COMMERCIAL INCIDENTS
During the monitoring period 8 – 14 July Regal Maritime Solutions (RMS) identified the following incidents in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden region:
MISSILE ATTACK: On 9 July at approximately 0435 UTC an explosion was reported in close proximity the MAERSK SENTONSA around 180NM east of Nishtun, Yemen. The vessel and crew were reported safe.
MISSILE ATTACK: On 10 July an explosion was reported in close proximity to a commercial vessel 40NM south of Al Mukha, Yemen. The vessel and crew were reported safe and vessel continued to its next port of call.
MISSILE ATTACK: On 11 July two explosions were reported in close proximity to a commercial vessel approximately 15NM southwest of Al Mukha. The vessel was not damaged and crew reported safe.
IRANIAN INTELLIGENCE VESSEL: The last reported position of the Iranian intelligence vessel, the Behshad, was on 2 June in the vicinity of Bostanu port in the Persian Gulf in Iranian territorial waters.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS – PIRACY RELATED ACTIVITY
During the monitoring period 8 – 14 July Regal Maritime Solutions (RMS) identified the following incidents in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean region utilizing information:
There were no reported or identified piracy incidents involving commercial vessels in the region during the monitoring period.
MSCHOA Update (12 July):
In the last 30 days, no new activity has been reported in the International Recognised Transit Corridor (IRTC), Gulf of Aden or Indian Ocean.
Over the past two weeks it has been assessed by EUNAVFOR Operation ATALANTA that the PAG operating near Central Somalia has moved southbound to the South Somali Basin due to current weather conditions. Meanwhile the PAG operating south of Socotra has moved northbound to the eastern Gulf of Aden to avoid monsoon weather.
It is assessed that due to the absence of recent piracy related incidents and monsoon weather impacting the central Somali basin, that no PAGs are active in the area, however there remains a realistic possibility of a piracy attack in the East Gulf of Aden and South Somali Basin due to improving weather conditions.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS – MILITARY ACTIVITY
During the monitoring period 8 – 14 July RMS identified the following incidents involving US coalition forces in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden region, obtained from military and open sources:
UAV INTERCEPT: On 9 July, US forces destroyed one Iranian-backed Houthi uncrewed aerial vehicle (UAV) in a Houthi controlled area of Yemen, believed as posing an imminent security threat to vessels in the region.
UAV INTERCEPT: On 10 July US forces destroyed two Houthi UAVs over the Red Sea and one Houthi uncrewed surface vessel (USV) in the Red Sea.
USV INTERCEPT: On 11 July US forces destroyed five Houthi USVs in the Red Sea considered as posing a direct and imminent threat to military and commercial vessels in the region.
UAV INTERCEPT: On 11 July, US forces also destroyed two Houthi UAVs over the Red Sea and another in a Houthi controlled area of Yemen.
UAV INTERCEPT: On 12 July US forces successfully destroyed three Houthi UAVs in a Houthi-controlled area of Yemen, considered as posing an imminent threat to vessels in the region.
UAV/USV INTERCEPT: On 14 July, US forces destroyed two Houthi UAVs over the Red Sea and another over a Houthi-controlled area of Yemen. Additionally, US forces destroyed one USV in the Red Sea.
since November 2023
KEY DEVELOPMENTS – HOUTHI MISSILE STATISTICS
Figures 1 and 2 identifies the number of missiles, UAV, USVs and UUVs launched, or prepared to be imminently launched, by Houthi militants from Yemen targeting commercial and naval vessels in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden regions. Figures have incorporated statistics from vessels hit, near misses and pre- emptive strikes on-land in Yemen by US-led Coalition forces but not those resulting from large scale coordinated military action. In some cases the destined target of Houthi weapons including destroyed on-land in Yemen cannot not be verified and has therefore been categorised as ‘Not Known’ (NK). Where no dates are provided there were no reported incidents or data available for that period.
ANALYSIS: The monitoring period saw an uptick in Houthi attacks compared to weeks prior. The attacks were predominantly focused in the Red Sea. The escalation of Houthi attacks on vessels in the region comes after a slight lull in attacks. Its believed the group has used the absence of the US aircraft carrier to regroup and relaunch new waves of attacks.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS – SECURITY INCIDENT MAPPING
1 Jan – 14 July 2024
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
During the monitoring period 8 – 14 July RMS identified the following key regional developments:
•The Yemen based Houthi group released a statement on 9 July indicating that they had targeted the MAERSK SENTOSA in the Arabian sea with several ballistic missiles and UAVs.
•At the time of writing there are reports of another vessel being struck by a USV approximately 97NM northwest of Al Hudaydah and another being targeted approximately 70NM southwest of Al Hudaydah, Yemen .
•The escalation of Houthi attacks on vessels in the region over the past week comes after a lull in attacks by the group. Its believed the group has used the absence of the US aircraft carrier, the USS Dwight D Eisenhower in the region, as an opportunity to regroup and to relaunch attacks ahead of a replacement carrier arriving.
•Iran has denied claims by the US that the country has been providing weapons to the Houthis in Yemen over the past few months. The US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) claimed that a missile launched towards a Norwegian-flagged oil tanker in the Red Sea in December 2023 was likely an Iran made anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM).
•Iran issued a statement at the United Nations denying US claims that Iranian made weapons are being used to target commercial vessels, claiming the Houthis had developed such military capabilities themselves. Despite Iran’s claims, and despite the seizure of several Iran ships carrying such weapons and components over the past year, Iran still supports the Houthi regime.
•Iran’s President elect Masoud Pezeshkian praised Yemen’s Houthi regime for their armed support for the Palestinians. This follows recent similar endorsements for Hamas and Hezbollah in which he pledged Iran’s full support and cooperation.
•An airstrike by the Israel Defense Force (IDF) on 13 July on an IDF identified ‘safe zone’ situated in Al-Mawasi in southern Gaza, killed over 90 Palestinians. The strike was an attempt by the IDF attempted to target Hamas commander Mohammed Deif, one of the masterminds of the 7 October attacks. The attack resulted in regional and international condemnation including from Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, Qatar, Turkey, Iran, and Yemen.
•Hamas announced it would be withdrawing from truce talks amid the Israeli strike in Gaza which killed scores of Palestinians. A Hamas spokesperson later issued a statement clarifying the claim as incorrect.
•Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah criticised the IDF’s airstrike on Al-Mawasi, reaffirming Hezbollah’s actions to strike Israeli targets as “fulfilling” it’s role in support of the Palestinians.
•On 10 July Iranian frigate Sahand sunk after it had capsized in the shallow waters in the port of Bandar Abbas in southern Iran on 8 July. It was the third navy ship Iran has lost in an accident since 2018. Iranian media claimed the Sahand initially “lost its balance due to water leakage into the tanks“ resulting in one fatality. It apparently sunk after a rope holding it had snapped.
ASSESSMENT
•Whilst there is a reduced risk of piracy in the central Somali Basin compared to months prior, due to poor weather conditions, the risk of pirate attacks has increased in the East Gulf of Aden and South Somali Basin maritime regions.
•Houthi attacks in the region is expected to continue with further complex attacks using a combination of aerial and USV weaponry expected. Vessels linked to Israel, the US and UK will remain primary, but not sole targets for Houthi militants.
•Houthi militants and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq will likely continue to target the Israeli port of Eilat in the Red Sea.
•Houthi use of inaccurate data and intelligence pertaining to target identification, and/or maintaining an effective command and control procedure with local units, places non Israeli, US and UK vessels at a risk of being misidentified.
•The US and its partners will continue to conduct pre-emptive strikes against Houthi targets on-land in an attempt to degrade Houthi military capability and prevent Houthi weaponry to be used to target commercial shipping. This capability is likely to be impacted in the short-term as a consequence of the USS Dwight D Eisenhower’s departure from the region without a suitable substitute.
•The US will continue its efforts to intercept vessels smuggling weapon components from Iran to the Houthis in Yemen and enhance its intelligence collection methods to support interdiction operations, as well as coordinate military strikes against Houthi weapon sites, facilities and capabilities.
•The US government will continue to push for a diplomatic solution for the Israel-Hamas conflict with regional partners due to the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Gaza and attempt to prevent escalatory military activity in the region, particularly in Lebanon.
•Any ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, may see a temporary pause in attacks, but continues to appear unlikely at present. High likelihood of intensified attacks by Israel on Hezbollah positions in southern Lebanon over the coming weeks due to increased Hezbollah activity along the Lebanon-Israel border.
RECOMMENDATIONS
•Merchant and other vulnerable vessels are recommended to register with the Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa’s Voluntary Registration Scheme due to heightened piracy threat in the Indian ocean.
•Avoid being in vicinity of Iranian Behshad vessel. Avoid where possible transiting locations within the UAE and Iranian coastlines due to the risk from Iranian military boarding parties.
•Vessels operating in the Indian Ocean area are urged to heighten their vigilance due expanded risk area from Houthi missile and UAV attack and continued threat from Pirate Activity Groups (PAGs) in the area.
•Report any Suspicious Sightings and be aware of the risk of Uncrewed Surface Vehicles (USVs) with dummy crews and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) attacks.
•Consider utilising a digital monitoring system, which incorporates UAV/UUV drone monitoring to warn of potential attack and use of physical barriers, such as nets and underwater barriers, that can be deployed to prevent UUVs from approaching a ship. These barriers can entangle or obstruct the movement of a UUV.
•Ensure crew conduct drills and training exercises to respond to UUV threats so that they are well-prepared to take appropriate action in the event of an incident.
•Follow guidance on loitering munitions as per the OCIMF website: https://www.ocimf.org/publications/information-papers/loitering-munitions-%E2%80%93-the-threat-to-merchant-ships
•Implement and review BMP5 in particular section 2, which describes non-piracy threats and the Global Anti-Piracy Guide.
•Consider mentioning vessel location to Flag Authorities.
•Inform UKMTO/MSCHoA of vessel movements and ensure radar is kept on.
•Communicate with local agents for any local information or intelligence.
•Keep VHF Ch16 on and pay attention to advisories. Ensure strict surveillance of communications and establish communication with all approaching vessels.
•Do not allow small boats to approach or dock. Consider utilizing an armed security team aboard.
•Ensure there is Hard Cover available if on deck and that it is accessible.
•Ensure a Secondary Muster Station is considered and identified to crew and not just the citadel.
•Maintain Bridge Watches. (Please be aware at night, small, slow vessels without a wake are difficult to detect on radar). Keep Traffic on Upper Deck to a minimum
•Ensure all fire-fighting equipment is checked and available for immediate use. Including the emergency fire pump and that relevant maintenance has been conducted.
